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This article compares the role of government in collective bargaining in five small West 
European countries. For the period until the second half of the 1970s. a distinction is made 
between countries in which government often interfered in wage bargaining. e.g. Denmark 
and The Netherlands. and countries in which government refrained from intervention, like 
Sweden. Belgium and, to a lesser degree. Norway. I n  all countries the trildition of (non)- 
intcrvcntion had already started before the Second World War. Thc article reviews some 
explanatory variables: in Scandinavia centralization of labour relations is crucial, in the Low 
Countries the nature of politicd wr i td i t ig .  Rcccnt dcvclopmcnts show that government 
intervention has becomc a characteristic of labour rcliitions in a11 but onc country. 
Introduction 
In the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s national governments have 
intervened in labour relations in all small West European democracies. 
Only for some of these nations was this a new experience. Indeed, for the 
period between 1945 and 1975 one can make a clear distinction between 
countries in which government played an active role in labour relations and 
countries in which it did not. The distinction applies especially to wage 
bargaining, the core of employer-union relations. It does not say anything 
about the formation of social and economic policy: ‘trilateralism’ in the 
latter has been combined with both government abstinence and government 
intervention in wage bargaining. 
The aim of this contribution is to demonstrate the difference between 
the two traditions, to offer some explanations and to trace back their 
origins. The distinction between the two traditions is all the more interesting 
since it cuts through Scandinavia. This could challenge the long-standing 
view of Scandinavia as a bloc of countries sharing the same social and 
political conditions. 
Related to the rising star of neo-corporatism in the second half of the 
1970s, the small nations of Western Europe have recently enjoyed wide 
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attention in comparative literature on social and economic policy and on 
labour relations. From the very beginning the idea of wage restraint has 
dominated the discussion on neo-corporatism: union participation in the 
determination of social and economic policy was related to wage restraint 
as a union concession. The former could even represent a compensation 
for the latter. However, the role of government in wage bargaining has not 
been a major topic of discussion or research in neo-corporatism. In most of 
the literature on neo-corporatism the small nations (apart from Switzerland) 
have been treated as belonging to a similzr tradition of corporatism. 
This article contains a description of the role of government in collective 
bargaining for the period 1945-75 in the next section, and then offers 
some explanations. Following this the paper considers labour truces and 
legislation in the 193Os, and this is followed by a discussion of more 
general explanatory variables and some country-specific variables. Recent 
developments are then discussed, and a summary and conclusion complete 
the article. The survey covers Scandinavia and the Low Countries, i.e. 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands and Belgium. In contrast 
to the other small nations. like Finland, Switzerland and Austria, their 
bargaining tradition dates back to the period before the Second World 
War. That allows us to study the pre-war roots of the tradition more in 
detail. 
Government Intervention in Wage Bargaining: 
1945-75 
Table 1 demonstrates the frequency and the forms of government inter- 
vention. A distinction is made between government activity before the start 
of bargaining and government intervention in the bargaining process or in 
a conflict. In the former case the government takes the initiative; in the 
latter, wage bargaining is initially left to the employers’ and workers’ 
organizations. 
The first category is divided into three sub-categories. Compulsory guide- 
lines (cat. l a )  are the strongest form of government activity. Wage policy 
other than strict wage guidelines (e.g. tax measures or a maximum to price 
compensation, cat. lb )  leaves more room for bargaining. Tripartism (cat. 
lc)  is the weakest form of pre-bargaining intervention: the government 
negotiates with the labour-market organizations, but does not set limits to 
wage increases. 
The second category, intervention in the process of bargaining or in a 
conflict, is also divided into three sub-categories. A direct government 
measure (cat. 2a) is a severe form of government intervention, even more 
than l b  and lc. It limits wage rise, without necessarily enjoying the support 
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Table 1. Forms of Government Intervention. 
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1 Government activity before the start of bargaining: 
a Compulsory guidelines 
b Wage policy other than strict guidelines 
c Tripartism 
a Direct government measure 
b Compulsory arbitration 
c Voluntary mediation 
2 Government intervention in bargaining or conflict 
( la) Compulsory guidelines, less strictly followed than in the period before. 
Source: country-specific literature listed in the text. 
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of trade unions and employers. Compulsory arbitration (cat. 2b) forces 
the parties to comply with government arbitration. Normally, however, 
arbitration is preceded by intensive consultation and is backed by both 
parties. Voluntary mediation (cat. 2c) is the weakest form of government 
intervention, since it does not affect the bargaining process at all. In 
Scandinavia this latter form of government interference is widespread, and 
part of an extensive pattern of conflict control. Being common practice, it 
is not mentioned in the table. The table lists only years in which government 
intervention affected a large part of the economy. 
Sweden 
In the 1950s and the first half of the  1960s, bargaining in Sweden was 
concentrated at sectoral level. Since 1956 general agreements have provided 
a global framework for such sectoral negotiations. The Swedish government 
did not interfere until 1971, when groups of central and local government 
employees went on strike. A law was passed to prolong all collective 
agreements and to ban industrial actions for a period of six weeks. The 
intervention was a very specific case, however, since it concerned state 
employees (Elvander 1980, 157-158; Forseback 1980). 
Norway 
The Norwegian organizations tried to co-ordinate sectoral-level bargaining 
in central negotiations from 1963 onwards, but they were not very success- 
ful. Sectoral agreements continued to dominate Norwegian industrial 
relations. 
In the first years following the Second World War, Norwegian govern- 
ments pursued a vigorous policy of price and wage control. Compulsory 
arbitration, dating from before the war, was reintroduced. In 1952 the 
system was changed into one of voluntary arbitration by the tripartite 
National Wage Board and local wage committees. In the face of the threat 
of a large conflict, government might still try compulsory arbitration, after 
consultation between the parties. In fact, compulsory arbitration was 
employed almost every year, but on only three occasions was it imposed 
on the private sector as a whole - in 1958, 1964 and 1966. It should be 
stressed that Norway is the only country with such a great variety of 
arbitration measures (Norwegian Joint Committee on International Social 
Policy 1975; Esping-Andersen 1985, 218-219). 
Denmark 
As in Sweden and Norway there was a (gradual) transition to more cen- 
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tralized bargaining. However, bargaining has always been less centralized 
than in the other Scandinavian countries. 
In Denmark, government intervention has been a distinctive feature of 
wage bargaining since 1945. If the,parties failed to reach an agreement and 
also rejected the mediation proposal of the State Mediator, government 
intervened by means of enacting the mediation proposal into law. Inter- 
vention affected most of the private sector in 1946,1947,1956 and, notably, 
1961. Until 1956 government intervention usually favoured the unions. In 
1956, for the first time a mediation proposal was made law which had been 
rejected by the trade-union federation. As in 1956, intervention in 1961 
followed upon a period of major strikes. In the 1960s government inter- 
ference in labour relations was reinforced. Already in 1963, before the start 
of negotiations, the government imposed a package of measures fixing 
wages and prices. This Hefhedsfmzing remained the only instance of 
compulsory wage guidelines in the period 1945-75, however. Since 1963 
government has presented a macro-economic framework for negotiations 
almost every year. Moreover, i t  has regularly defined limits to wage 
increases, e.g. by fixing a maximum to the price compensation (Ibsen & 
J~rgensen 1979, 114-140, 301-324; Michels 1986, ch. 5). 
The Netherlands 
Although sectoral agreements constituted the core of the Dutch bargaining 
system, until 1968 they were subject to a strict ‘Guided Wage Policy’. In 
the formation and implementation of this policy the (three) trade-union 
federations and (two) employers’ associations co-operated with government 
in a very intimate and formalized way. 
From 1945 to 1959 a ‘Board of State Mediators’ checked if collective 
agreements were in accordance with the strict guidelines on wage increase, 
which were issued by the government after consultation each year with 
the peak organizations. In 1959 the Board was abolished and the peak 
organizations themselves took over its task. From then on they not only 
advised government on the wage guidelines, but also implemented wage 
policy. In 1963-64 the tight labour market caused an erosion of wage policy 
and in 1968 it was given up. In 1970 a law established free bargaining, but 
at the same time established the government’s right to interfere in the event 
of wages endangering the national interest. Already in the same year the 
government applied the law for the first time and issued a wage pause 
(Windmuller et  al. 1983, chs 5-7, 12). 
Belgium 
Belgian wage bargaining has comprised a combination of sectoral agree- 
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ments and enterprise bargaining in the larger (i.e. mostly Walloon) enter- 
prises. In the 1950s wage negotiations were hardly co-ordinated by the 
peak organizations. In the 1960s central co-ordination, or ‘social pro- 
grammation’ as it was called, was introduced, but it hardly affected wage 
bargaining. 
Apart from a few years after liberation, when collective bargaining was 
subject to state measures, government has never interfered in bargaining. 
Exceptionally (e.g. in 1952 and 1955) it was involved as a one-time 
mediator, upon request of the labour-market parties (Slomp & van Mierlo 
1984. vol. 2, chs 7, 9). 
Some Explanations 
As the survey shows, the five nations differed in frequency and scope of 
government intervention. In Sweden intervention was totally absent, in 
Belgium it was absent after the years of reconstruction. In Norway state 
intervention was reduced in 1952 to arbitration in case of protracted 
disagreement in sectoral bargaining. In neither of these countries did 
government determine the level of wages, as it did in The Netherlands and 
regularly also in Denmark. In The Netherlands strict guidelines were the 
rule, and in Denmark intervention was also rather common. 
For possible explanations of this difference between Sweden, Norway 
and Belgium on the one hand and The Netherlands and Denmark on the 
other, one might look both to government and to the nature of labour 
relations. In particular, participation of social democrats in government, 
centralization of labour relations and stability in the rate of labour conflicts 
probably favour non-intervention. 
Social-democrat participation in government (see Table 2) has this effect 
because of the rather strict separation between political action and industrial 
action in the labour relations of northern continental Europe. The sep- 
aration has been one of the early characteristics of social-democratic labour 
movements. It has been conducive to the division of labour in a political 
party for political action and trade unions for industrial action. The division 
of labour is apparent also in the relative absence of political strikes in this 
part of Europe (Bean 1986, chs 2, 5; Slomp 1990, chs 3, 4). Employers 
oppose state intervention in the case of social-democratic participation in 
government, since they fear intervention might favour the unions. 
Centralization of bargaining may actually be a device to prevent govern- 
ment intervention. It certainly makes intervention a more tricky affair 
since it is bound to offend one of the peak organizations. In the case of 
decentralized bargaining the effect is different, since the central organ- 
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Table 2. Years of Social-democratic Participation in Government 1930-88. 
Sweden Norway Denmark Neths Belgium 
Period a b c a b c  a b c a  b c a b  c 
193040 4 44 s t  11 4 14 
1945-74 234 6 234 1 13 8 44 13 6 134 
1975-88 9 10 6 1  3 1  5 
a the only party in government 
b the largest party in coalition government 
c a minor party in coalition government 
In years of a change in government composition, both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ government 
have been counted as a half ( 1 ) .  
izations can stay aloof. The third factor, stability of the rate of conflict, 
reduces the need of any state intervention. 
In  Scandinavia there is a clear relation between social-democratic par- 
ticipation and government abstinence in labour relations. In Sweden and 
Norway social democrats participated or, even better, were the only party 
in government for most of the time. In Denmark they participated less 
often and were involved more frequently in coalition governments 
(Elvander 1980, 18). The relation does not hold in the Low Countries. In 
both countries social democrats participated less often and as a minor party 
most of the time, but the two countries differ completely in degree of 
government intervention (Geul et al. 1986). 
The second explanation, centralization of bargaining, also holds true for 
Scandinavia. The labour movement and the employers’ organizations in 
Norway and Sweden have been far more centralized than in Denmark 
(Esping-Andersen 1985, 58-63). In the latter country the continued exist- 
ence of a number of craft unions prevented more centralization. Notably 
in Sweden, early centralization, related to the unions’ ‘solidaristic wage 
policy’, allowed central bargaining and prevented government intervention. 
Again, this explanation applies to Scandinavia alone. In Belgium both the 
labour-movement and employers’ organizations were far less centralized 
than in any Scandinavian country. During the 1950s central-level contacts 
were rare; during the 1960s they took place, but without much effect on 
sector-level bargaining (Slomp & van Mierlo 1984, chs 8,lO). Nevertheless, 
government did not interfere in bargaining. The Netherlands is a rather 
specific case, since centralization and wage policy were intimately related. 
Although bargaining took place in each industry separately, the central 
organizations used the function of consultation with government to keep 
their member organizations under control (Windmuller et  al. 1983, chs 4, 
5 ) .  Thus, Belgium and The Netherlands run against the argument of a 
relation between centralization and non-intervention. 
The third explanatory variable is variation in labour conflicts. In Sweden 
and Norway the rate of conflict has been low since the Second World War, 
with only minor variation between the years (Elvander 1980, 154-155). 
Denmark has an even lower strike profile, but it has been interrupted by 
exceptional years in which the number of working days lost surpasses even 
the 'top years' of Sweden and Norway taken together (ibid. 153). In these 
years, 1946,1956, 1961 and 1973, government interfered, but the incidence 
is probably too low to speak of a relation between instability of strike 
rate and government intervention. Anyway, the relation is specific for 
Scandinavia, again. The Netherlands not only has a very low strike level, 
but also a very stable one (Windmuller et al. 1983, 217, 392). Belgium has 
the highest strike rate of the five nations, but without much variation either, 
apart from political strikes, e.g. in 1950 and 1960 (Slomp & van Mierlo 
1984, vol. 2, 244-245). This means that the variation of the strike rate 
does not explain intervention in The Netherlands and non-intervention in 
Belgium. 
Thus, the three explanatory variables apply to Scandinavia. The first two 
explanations in particular, government composition and centralization of 
bargaining, could offer a clue to the difference in government involvement 
between Norway and Sweden on the one hand, and Denmark on the other. 
They do not apply to the Low Countries, however. Are Scandinavia and 
the Low Countries, then, as combinations of national cases, too different 
to be compared? A crucial difference could be the minor position of social 
democrats ois-u-ois Christian democrats in government most of the time - 
if social democrats participated at all. A second difference is the existence 
of the Christian-democrat union movement. In Belgium it even surpassed 
the  socialist movement in numbers in the late 1950s. 
Apart from these explanatory variables, a second course to an expla- 
nation could be to go back into history. Did a tradition of (non-)intervention 
already exist before the war? Since government intervention in Denmark 
started in the 1930s and Dutch legislation on intervention was passed in 
the same period, we turn to that decade of crisis. 
Labour Truces and Labour Legislation in the 1930s 
The crisis of the 1930s and the changes in international politics were the 
main background for a number of labour truces and for labour legislation. 
Both labour truces and legislation were attempts to promote sectoral wage 
bargaining and to keep down the number of conflicts, as a condition for 
economic recovery. Agreements were concluded in Sweden (1938), Norway 
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(1935) and Belgium (1936). Legislation on collective bargaining was passed 
in Denmark (1933) and The Netherlands (1937). 
Sweden 
In the first half of the 1930s Sweden had a high strike rate. After 1935-36 
economic conditions improved and the strike rate declined, under a 
coalition of social democrats and the farmers’ party. Although this govern- 
ment, like its (social-democratic) predecessors, refrained from intervention 
in labour conflicts, there was some fear of such intervention, especially 
among employers. This fear was one of the backgrounds to the Saltsjobaden 
agreement of 1938. The agreement provided for a permanent Labour 
Market Council as a central forum of the two labour-market parties 
(Elvander 1980, 72-73; Forseback 1980, 10-12). 
Norway 
The Norwegian agreement of 1935, Hooeduurale, banned strikes during 
the term of a collective agreement and introduced procedures for starting 
and mediating conflicts. I t  recognized the right to organize, and laid down 
rights and obligations of the Norwegian shop stewards. The agreement was 
preceded by years of a high strike rate, including the largest conflict in 
Norwegian industrial history, in 1931, which had lasted for five months. 
After a peak of over 30 percent, unemployment was falling again at the 
time of the truce. Political conditions changed as well. The social democrats 
had raised their votes in the elections of 1933 from 31.4 to an unprecedented 
40.1 percent, and in 1935 they succeeded a liberal government. The truce 
was concluded eleven days before this cabinet was installed. The social 
democrat rise to power was an explicit precondition of the truce. The trade- 
union federation wanted to prevent labour conflicts, and the employers to 
keep government out of bargaining (Galenson 1949, 192-196; Elvander 
1980, 72). 
Denmark 
In 1933, Denmark proclaimed a one-year freeze of labour conditions 
(prolonging all existing agreements by one year) and a ban on strikes and 
lock-outs during that period. The measure was part of a broad package of 
government measures, called the Kunslergadeforlig, aimed to support the 
farmers and the unemployed. 
The measure was taken by a coalition cabinet of social democrats and 
left-wing liberals (Radikale Venstre), in power since 1929. It was preceded 
by the employers’ demand to cut wages by 20 percent. Since the wage stop 
29 
prevented any such wage cut, the trade-union movement expressed only a 
weak protest. Economic considerations were probably an overriding con- 
cern in this rather specific measure, the more so since unemployment had 
reached a peak of over 30 percent. The intervention of 1933 was followed 
by similar though less strong government action in 1937, 1938 and 1939 
(Galenson 1952, 13&132; Ibsen & Jargensen 1979, 18-23). 
The Netherlands 
The Dutch conservative-confessional governments did not leave the gold 
standard until 1936 and as a consequence the growth of unemployment 
continued until that year. One of the few anti-crisis measures before that 
time was a law in 1935 to  promote cartelization. It provided government 
with the right to declare cartel agreements binding upon protesting indus- 
trialists. 
The cartel law was the last cause for a law in 1937 providing the same 
facilities for sectoral collective agreements. Like the cartel law, the new 
law allowed government to  undo any collective agreement. The argument 
for this unique provision, which allowed the curbing of wages, was one of 
principle, rather than fear of a wage drift following the devaluation. Labour 
conflicts did not pose a problem, since the rate of conflict had been very 
low since the beginning of the crisis. Thus, government intervention in 
wage formation was legalized rather early in The Netherlands. Social 
democrats played no role in this legislation; they did not participate in 
government until 1939 (Windmuller et al. 1983, 71-75). 
Belgium 
In 1936, when unemployment was definitely on the decline, both socialists 
and Christian democrats lost 21 seats to the fascist REX movement. After 
the socialist failure to form a cabinet, a strike broke out in Antwerp. It 
spread throughout the country, and became the largest labour conflict in 
pre-war Belgian history. The socialist and Catholic unions at first attributed 
the actions to fascist rioters, but the disappointment about the social- 
democratic performance in the elections also played a role. After a while the 
socialist union movement, later joined by the Catholic union organization, 
reluctantly supported the strikes and then demanded the new (Catholic) 
prime minister to force the employers’ organization to the bargaining table. 
It probably wanted to get some compensation for what it might have got 
under a social-democratic prime minister. 
In a scenario similar to that of Matignon in France three months before, 
the Prime Minister presided over a ‘Labour Conference’. The conference 
was followed by a revival of bargaining in existing or newly created ‘parity 
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committees’. In December 1939, after the outbreak of the Second World 
War, a second Labour Conference was held, to stabilize wages (Slomp & 
van Mierlo 1984, vol. 1,  176-182). 
General and Country-specific Explanations 
To some extent the distinction between Sweden, Norway and Belgium on 
the one hand and Denmark and The Netherlands on the other dates from 
the 1930s. Although in Sweden and Norway government intervention was 
in the background, a central agreement prevented such intervention. The 
aim of government intervention in Belgium in 1936 was not to decide on 
labour conditions, but to encourage, if not enforce, negotiations. The 
pattern of post-war intervention in Denmark was set by regular inter- 
ference. In The Netherlands, government did not interfere directly but laid 
down the principle of intervention in a law. 
It  is tempting to look at the same explanatory variables as those of the 
post-war period in order to find an explanation for the differences of 
the 1930s: if they do  not offer a complete explanation for the post-war 
continuation of traditions of (non-)intervention, do they apply to the 
beginning of the tradition? 
In particular, government composition could be of importance, since it 
was involved as an issue in Norway and possibly also in Belgium. Govern- 
ment composition (in particular, social-democratic participation) does not 
offer an explanation, however, not even for Scandinavia. In Denmark 
social democrats were the largest party in government during the whole 
decade, while in Sweden they were the largest party or they governed 
without a coalition partner from 1932 onwards. In Norway they mono- 
polized government after 1935; in Belgium they participated from 1935 
onwards; and in The Netherlands they were kept out of government by 
the large Catholic party. Thus, both intervention and non-intervention 
occurred ur.der governments with and without a social-democratic element. 
Differences in the degree of centralization were already the same as 
those after the war: relative centralization in Norway and Sweden, relative 
decentralization in The Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. The Belgian 
Labour Conference of 1936 could suggest a high degree of centralization, 
but the socialist union confederation did not even have a common strike 
fund by that time. (It set up such a fund in 1937, in reaction to the events 
of 1936.) 
The trends in the rate of strikes were very diverse in the 1930s and in 
general there was more variation between the countries and over time than 
after the war. In view of the short period involved since the outbreak of 
the crisis the rate of conflict might be more important than the time 
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variations in strike rate. In Sweden the rate was very high until 1934. In 
1938 there was a new peak. In contrast, the Norwegian agreement was 
concluded at a low tide of conflict. The strike rate under the agreement 
(193639) was even higher than in the first half of the 193Os! Denmark had 
a low level of conflict after 1932, and The Netherlands after 1933. In 
Denmark this low level was interrupted by an occasional very high strike 
rate in 1936. In Belgium the Labour Conference was related to an outburst 
of strike activity. Thus, both intervention and non-intervention were related 
to a low strike rate and stability in the rate of conflict (Galenson 1952,285- 
290; Windmuller et al. 1983, 217; Slomp & van Mierlo 1984, vol. 2, 244- 
245). 
This means there is no  overall explanation for the differences in inter- 
vention in the 1930s. Degree of centralization may offer an explanation for 
Scandinavia; cabinet composition does not. 
Although the search for explanations has been a seemingly disappointing 
one, at least there is clarity on one point: the variation in degree of 
government intervention has its roots in the 1930s. Concerning the explana- 
tory variables, only centralization can count as one, and it applies to 
Scandinavia alone. 
To explain the differences in intervention between The Netherlands and 
Belgium, we should probably turn to a political phenomenon: uerzuiling 
(i.e. the existence of rather isolated ‘blocs’ of socialist and Catholic organ- 
izations, including political parties, trade unions and employers’ organ- 
izations). 
Though uerzuiling has been a predominant characteristic of politics in 
both countries, the effects on the place of national government have been 
quite opposed. Until recently the Dutch uerzuiling consisted of three 
blocs (Catholic, Protestant, social democratic). Since all governments were 
coalitions of at least two blocs (Catholic and Protestant), they could develop 
a position of uncontested neutrality, ‘above the parties’. Governments 
reinforced their position by a heavy emphasis on economic conditions, as 
‘objective’ parameters of wage increase, and wage policy: almost without 
exception, Dutch labour relations and government intervention reflected 
changes in economic conditions (Slomp 1985; Geul et al. 1986). In contrast, 
the Belgian pattern of uerzuiling implied a division in two blocs (Catholic, 
social democratic), hence a polarization of social and political life. This did 
not leave much room for ‘objective’ parameters like those applied in The 
Netherlands. Moreover, government intervention (whether by Catholics 
or social democrats) would seriously strain the relations between the 
socialist organizations and their traditionally uproarious members in Wal- 
lony and could easily lead to widespread labour revolt. While avoiding 
political conflict in The Netherlands rests on ‘depoliticization’, in the form 
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of government intervention applying ‘objective’, i.e. economic, yardsticks, 
in Belgium it is possible only by government abstinence. 
This explanation of variation between The Netherlands and Belgium 
reinforces the idea that both the sphere of labour relations and the sphere 
of politics may offer explanations: centralization of labour relations in 
Scandinavia and the nature of politics in the Low Countries. 
Recent Developments 
From the mid-1970s onwards, the small countries have been affected by an 
economic recession. In response to this change in economic conditions, the 
governments in all five countries have been involved in collective bargaining 
for the last 15 years. This could imply either a break with the past or a 
continuation of existing practice. The degree of government intervention 
in collective bargaining and the form it took has not been the same, however 
(see Table 1). 
State interference in collective bargaining has been least far-reaching in 
Sweden: the government did not impose a wage policy or intervene directly. 
However, in the 1970s and 1980s government often negotiated with the 
labour-market organizations and on some occasions offered compensation 
for wage restraint. 
In Norway there has also been a shift towards more government inter- 
vention. In 1976, for the first time, tripartite negotiations were held. 
From that time government has regularly participated in central-level 
negotiations, in order to fix maximum wage increases and to construct 
a (new) framework for union-employer negotiations. In 1979 and 1988 
government laid down severe restrictions to wages - in 1979 by means of 
compulsory guidelines, and in 1988 by enacting the agreement between the 
central organizations in order to stave off wage drift. 
Government involvement in Belgium started in 1975. At  first government 
intervened indirectly by means of a tax on wage increases. In the early 
1980s government intervention was more direct. If the central organizations 
failed to reach an agreement, a law was passed to stabilize wages. The law 
could be replaced by an agreement, on condition that the latter provided 
for the same wage restraint as the law. In 1986, for the first time since 
the 1970s, a ‘real’ agreement was concluded between the labour-market 
organizations again. 
In Denmark, intervention in collective bargaining has continued in two 
ways: firstly, by a rigid incomes policy, fixing maximum wage increases, 
and secondly, by mediation proposals and wage stops if negotiations fail. 
The latter condition was met several times in the 1970s. In the 1980s most 
agreements between employers and unions have been concluded without 
government intervention. 
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Dutch governments have continued the tradition of heavy state involve- 
ment in wage determination. Although formal wage policy had been given 
up in 1968, the government intervened several times in the 1970s by means 
of wage freezes and wage pauses. Since 1982 government intervention has 
decreased. This is partly due to the disappearance of the very intricate 
system of linkages between wages in the public sector, wages in the private 
sector and social-security benefits. The public sector and social security 
have lagged behind wage developments in the private sector. This has 
caused the trade-union movement to moderate wage demands in the private 
sector. 
Thus, in  all countries government has become involved in wage bar- 
gaining and one can no longer make a clear-cut distinction between two 
groups of countries with respect to government intervention. However, the 
degree of intervention is different for the five countries. I n  Sweden it 
represents a gradual change, rather than a break with a long tradition of 
non-intervention. Government intervention in Sweden is less far-reaching 
than in the other nations. In Belgium, and to a lesser degree Norway, there 
has been a clear increase in government intervention, representing a break 
with the past. In Denmark and The Netherlands government intervention 
has remained an aspect of labour relations. Government retreat in the 
1980s can only be explained by the lasting structural crisis in  these countries, 
which forces the trade-union movement on the defensive and thus has a 
moderating influence on wage demands. When the economy recovers, wage 
claims may well, or even may probably, lead to renewed government 
intervention. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Literature of neo-corporatism concentrates on the co-operation between 
government, employers’ associations and the trade-union federations in 
the formulation and implementation of social and socioeconomic policy. 
Wage restraint is an important condition of the success of neo-corporatism. 
However, the role of government in collective bargaining and wage deter- 
mination has hardly been a topic of discussion and research in neo-cor- 
poratist theories. 
In this article we described the role of government in collective bargaining 
for five small West European countries. It appears that, for the period until 
the second half of the 1970s, a distinction can be made between countries 
in which government interfered often in wage bargaining, e.g. Denmark 
and The Netherlands, and countries in which government refrained from 
intervention, like Sweden, Belgium and, to a lesser degree, Norway. In 
this respect Denmark shows more similarities with The Netherlands than 
with Norway and Sweden. 
34 
In Scandinavia, centralization of labour relations is crucial, in the Low 
Countries the nature of political oerzuiling. In all countries the tradition 
of (non-)intervention had already started before the war. Recent devel- 
opments show that government intervention has become a characteristic 
of labour relations in all but one country, even in countries which had a 
long tradition of non-intervention. 
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